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Abstract
This paper documents and provides an explanation for the main stylized facts about net and
gross workers ￿ows across states in the U.S. While it is generally known that gross ￿ows of pop-
ulation across locations are signi￿cantly larger in the U.S. than within most European countries,
there is considerable heterogeneity in gross and net ￿ows across states within the U.S. itself. The
main purpose of the paper is to test whether a general equilibrium model based on Lucas and
Prescott (1974)￿s island economy, augmented to allow for gross workers ￿ows, can account for
the main stylized facts. The key stylized facts are as follows. In the cross-sectional dimension:
(1) Gross in￿ow rates are more dispersed than net in￿ow rates, which are more dispersed than
gross out￿ow rates. (2) Gross in￿ow and out￿ow rates are positively correlated. (3) Gross and
net in￿ow rates are highly positively correlated, while net ￿ow rates and gross out￿ow rates are
uncorrelated. In the time-series dimension, there is a large degree of persistence in both gross
and net ￿ow rates across Census years for a given state. To address these facts, I develop a
general equilibrium model of net and gross workers￿ ￿ows across locations. Net ￿ows are driven
by shocks to local labor demand, while gross ￿ows are driven by idiosyncratic location-speci￿c
shocks to workers￿ productivity. In response to shocks to the growth rate of labor productivity
in a location, the model generates arti￿cial data that are generally consistent with the stylized
facts listed above. Using the estimated parameters I ￿nd that the contribution of excess workers
￿ows to aggregate welfare is about one percent of aggregate output in the benchmark economy.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Workers￿ ￿ows across U.S. states are the main factor behind the large and persistent dispersion in
states￿ relative employment growth over time (Blanchard and Katz (1992)). Yet, the process by
which population is reallocated among geographic areas within a country is not well understood.
This paper argues that in order to improve this understanding it is important to consider both
gross and net ￿ows of workers across states. The analysis of both ￿ows allows one to determine
the extent to which net gains of employment by some states are due to higher gross in￿ows or,
alternatively, to lower gross out￿ows of workers.
This paper has two goals. The ￿rst one is to construct empirical measures of net and gross ￿ows
of workers across states and to characterize the main cross-sectional and time-series stylized facts
in this area. The second goal is to determine whether the main stylized facts can be explained using
a general equilibrium model of workers ￿ows across locations. The model is a version of Lucas and
Prescott (1974)￿s island economy, extended to allow for gross migration ￿ows.
I start by documenting these facts using the decennial Census of the U.S. for the post-WWII
period. The latter allows one to determine a respondent￿s state of residence in the Census year as
well as ￿ve years before the Census year. This information is used to construct state-level aggregate
gross and net rates of workers ￿ows. These ￿ows are adjusted to take into account the diﬀerent
demographic and industrial composition of the workforce across states and diﬀerences in other state
characteristics, such as size.
The key stylized facts are as follows. First, gross ￿ows of workers are large relative to net ￿ows.
For example, between 1995 and 2000 the average state gained or lost about 2.2 percent of its 1995
population. In the same period, the average state experienced a combined in￿ow and out￿ow of
population of about 17 percent of its 1995 population. Second, most interstate ￿ows of workers
occur within narrowly de￿ned demographic groups. Third, in the cross-sectional dimension: (1)
Gross in￿ow rates are more dispersed than net in￿ow rates, which are more dispersed than gross
out￿ow rates. (2) Gross in￿ow and out￿ow rates are positively correlated. (3) Gross and net
in￿ow rates are highly positively correlated, while net ￿ow rates and gross out￿ow rates tend to be
uncorrelated. These facts seem to suggest that reallocation of population within the U.S. occurs
mainly through variations in gross in￿ows (large in fast-growing states and small in slow-growing
states), rather than in gross out￿ows. In other words, states that tend to lose population to other
states do so by attracting fewer new workers as opposed to losing more local ones. Fourth, in
the time-series dimension, there is a large degree of persistence in both gross and net ￿ow rates
across Census years for a given state. Fifth and last, there is a signi￿cantly positive cross-sectional
correlation between average state wages, adjusted by diﬀerences in living costs, and net ￿ow rates.
In order to account for these facts, I consider a model of gross and net ￿ows. The model
economy is composed by a set of local labor markets (￿islands￿), that are hit by idiosyncratic labor
demand shocks. Local wages would tend to rise in response to these shocks, but workers￿ mobility
across islands tends to equalize the price of an eﬃciency unit of labor across islands. At a point
in time, a location typically experiences both gross in￿ows and gross out￿ows. This is because
a worker￿s idiosyncratic productivity diﬀers across islands, giving rise to workers￿ gross ￿ows. In
2general equilibrium, the value of migration is pinned down by a zero excess demand condition for
aggregate net ￿ows.
The model￿s parameters are estimated using a method of simulated moments. The estimated
model is consistent with the main stylized facts mentioned above. The mechanics of the model
can be better understood by considering an unanticipated positive shock to the growth rate of
local labor productivity. On impact, the workers￿ net ￿ow rate rises while the out￿ow rate remains
virtually constant. This is because gross in￿ows of workers are expected to arbitrage away the
temporarily higher unit price of labor in the location. In the following periods, out￿ows rise above
their steady state value, as some of the location￿s newly arrived workers are ex-post unlucky and
decide to move again. The persistent nature of innovations to local labor demand shocks implies
that net ￿ows remain above steady state for several periods. Due to the response of gross out￿ows,
gross in￿ows exceed net in￿ows. Thus, gross in￿ows are more volatile than net in￿ows, which, in
turn, are more volatile than gross out￿ows. Gross in￿ow and out￿ow rates are positively correlated
as larger gross in￿ows of workers are followed by larger gross out￿ows.
I use the estimated model to assess the contribution to aggregate output of workers￿ excess ￿ows
(i.e., gross ￿ows minus absolute net ￿ows) across U.S. states. By counterfactually imposing that
workers cannot migrate in order to improve their idiosyncratic match with their state of residence,
I ￿nd that excess ￿ows account for about one percent of aggregate output.
This paper is related to several literatures. The closest literature is the one initiated by Lucas
and Prescott (1974) in their ￿island￿ model of the labor market and extended by Jovanovic and
Moﬃtt (1990) to account for gross ￿ows.1 Lucas and Prescott develop a model of workers￿ net
￿ows across locations driven by shocks to local labor demand. In a sense the present paper can be
thought of as a version of Lucas and Prescott (1974) in which also workers are hit by idiosyncratic
location-speci￿c productivity shocks, giving rise to gross ￿ows of workers.
T h ei m p o r t a n c eo fg r o s s￿ows of workers across sectors was ￿rst highlighted by Jovanovic and
Moﬃtt (1990) who considered a simpli￿ed version of the Lucas-Prescott model allowing for sector-
speci￿c shocks to workers￿ productivity. An important insight of this model is that the introduction
of idiosyncratic shocks has implications for the dynamics of sectoral wages. For example, in the
Jovanovic and Moﬃtt paper net ￿ows are such that unit wages are always equalized across sectors.
In the original contribution by Lucas and Prescott, instead, the fact that workers are homogeneous
within an island implies that wage diﬀerentials across islands are necessary to give rise to net
￿ows. In addition to focusing on geographic, as opposed to sectoral, mobility, my paper diﬀers
from Jovanovic and Moﬃtt (1990) in several important dimensions. First, Jovanovic and Moﬃtt
do not estimate the parameters of their structural model, but rather tested some of its empirical
implications. Second, in their model workers live for only two periods and can therefore move only
once in their lifetime. This assumption simpli￿es the analysis considerably but it is ill suited to the
empirical application of the model. Third, Jovanovic and Moﬃtt focus on an equilibrium in which
gross in￿ows into each sector are always strictly positive, so that unit wages are equalized across
sectors. While this assumption greatly simpli￿es the analysis, its validity is an empirical issue. It
turns out that, in my model, equilibria in which unit wages are equalized cannot reproduce the
1Topel (1986) considers a setting similar to Lucas and Prescott (1974).
3statistical properties of net ￿ows across U.S. states. In order to account for the latter it is necessary
to take explicitly into account the possibility of corner solutions in which gross in￿ows are zero.
The paper also builds on the contribution by Blanchard and Katz (1992), who developed a
reduced form model of workers￿ net ￿ows across U.S. states, and provide some interesting VAR
evidence on the nature of states￿ adjustment process to local labor demand shocks. Relative to
Blanchard and Katz, this paper also focuses on gross ￿ows of workers.2
Finally, this paper is related to the partial equilibrium literature on the determinants of workers￿
migration decisions. Kennan and Walker (2005) carefully estimate such model using NLSY data
and use the panel structure of the data to identify wage diﬀerences due to location eﬀects.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the stylized
facts. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 oﬀers a discussion of some modelling issues. Section
5 evaluates the model in light of the stylized facts of Section 2. Section 7 computes the contribution
to aggregate output of excess ￿ows of workers across U.S. states. Section 8 concludes. The data
appendix oﬀers a more detailed description of the data and the construction of the ￿ow variables.
2 Data and Stylized Facts
Data on Workers￿ Flows. The main data set I use is the U.S. Census of Population for several
decades.4 The Census data have the clear advantage of being a large and comprehensive dataset.
Information on geographic mobility of individuals is available from other sources. For example,
the March Current Population Survey (March CPS) contains such information, but only includes
approximately 60,000 households. Given that, on average only 3 percent of the population leaves its
state of residence in a given year, this amounts to observing less than 2,000 households migrating
across state lines, or, on average, 40 households per state. In contrast, the decennial Census
typically contains information on million of households.
Since 1940, the Census questionnaire has included a question regarding the location (state and
metropolitan area) where an individual was living ￿ve years before the Census interview. Using
this information, I construct rates of gross and net ￿ows of population across the 48 contiguous
United States.5 The population ￿ows always refer to the ￿ve year period preceding the Census
year, and represent a lower bound on the actual ￿ows, as some individuals moved more than once
2More recent contributions by macroeconomists to the literature on internal migration of workers include Hassler
et al (2005) and Lkhagvasuren (2005). The former argue that diﬀerences in the generosity of unemployment insurance
between the U.S. and Europe can explain higher internal mobility rates in the U.S. The latter paper tries to explain
the existence of persistent diﬀerentials in unemployment rates across U.S. states by means of a general equilibrium
matching model with location-speci￿c idiosyncratic productivity shocks. The paper is also related to the traditional
research on the determinants of population ￿ows within the U.S., surveyed by Greenwood (1975) and more recently
developed by Greenwood and Hunt (1984) and Treyz et al. (1993). The contribution of this paper relatively to this
mostly empirical literature is to develop a tractable structural model of gross workers ￿ows.
3See also Dahl (2002) and Borjas, Bronars and Trejo (1992).
4This is available online at www.ipums.org/usa.
5The levels of in￿ow and out￿ow of population for a given state were standardized by the number of individuals
who were surveyed in the Census year and reported living in that state 5 years before. Net ￿ow rates were de￿ned
as the diﬀerence between gross in￿ow and out￿ow rates.
4during these ￿ve years. In order to focus on geographic mobility that is not motivated by college
attendance or retirement, I restrict attention to individuals who were between 27 and 60 years of age
and in the labor force at the time of the Census. The sample includes both U.S. born individuals
as well as foreign-born ones who immigrated to the U.S. at least ￿ve years prior to the Census
year. This restriction is necessary for aggregate net ￿ows of workers to equal zero. The appendix
contains more detailed information on issues of sample selection as well as on the construction of
the variables described below. From now on, for simplicity, I will refer to a state￿s ￿population￿ as
the collection of individuals satisfying the sample selection criteria described in the appendix.
Before proceeding it is necessary to brie￿y comment on the choice of U.S. states as primary
units of analysis. Since the focus of the paper is the geographic mobility of workers, the ideal unit
of analysis should be a local labor market. The latter concept is intuitive but not simple to de￿ne
unambiguously. In practice, a local labor market is often associated with a metropolitan area. In
this paper I have chosen not to take a metropolitan area as the basic unit of analysis for several
reasons. First, the 1970 Census does not report information on an individual￿s metropolitan area of
residence in 1965. This information is instead available at the state level.6 This is important because
the information contained in the 1970-2000 Censuses is used below to estimate the stochastic process
for local labor demand shocks. The lack of the 1970 data would further reduce the already short
time-series dimension of the data. Second, about 20 percent of the U.S. population does not
currently live in a metropolitan area. This ￿gure has increased by about 10 percentage points since
1970, and it displays a non-trivial geographic variation. Therefore, also in this case there would
be some ambiguity associated with the de￿nition of a local labor market. Third, according to the
Census there are more than 200 metropolitan areas in the U.S. This ￿gure makes the estimation
of the model extremely lengthy, while it is feasible, yet long, to work with 48 locations. Last, for
the purpose of policy analysis, many labor market policies (e.g. unemployment insurance) are set
at the state level.
Composition Eﬀects and Heterogeneity Across States. Figures 1-3 report scatter plots of
out￿ow, in￿ow and net ￿ow rates computed using the raw data from the 2000 Census. There
is, of course, considerable heterogeneity among states in at least two dimensions. First, at the
micro level, diﬀerent states have a diﬀerent composition of population, in terms of age, education,
industry of employment, etc. When comparing measures of population ￿ows across states, one
has to make sure to control for possible composition eﬀects. It can, in fact, be that certain states
exhibit higher gross ￿ows because of the sectoral or demographic composition of their employment
structure. For example, if the gambling industry has a particularly high turnover of workers￿, then
we might expect the state of Nevada, in which this industry is particularly large, to feature large
in￿ows and out￿ows of workers. To address the micro heterogeneity, I divide the population into
490 demographic groups de￿ned by age, education, and industry. Then, I compute gross out￿ow
and in￿ow rates for each state and for each demographic group. Last, I compute the state-wide
rates as a weighted average of the groups￿ rates, using as a weight for each group its relative size
in the U.S. population. It turns out that the gross ￿ows obtained using this procedure are very
6Speci￿cally, the Census variable migmet5 (metropolitan area of residence 5 years before) is not available in 1970,
while the variable migplac5 (state of residence 5 years before) is.
5close to the unadjusted ones.7 Thus, composition eﬀects due to cross-state heterogeneity in the
age, education and industry aﬃliation of the states￿ population do not seem to play an important
role in explaining diﬀerential gross population ￿ows across states.
At the macro level, states have diﬀerent sizes, diﬀerent numbers of large metropolitan areas,
etc. The concern here is that diﬀerences in gross ￿ows might be driven by some of these factors, as
opposed to the economic forces I would like to emphasize. To address this macro heterogeneity, I
have run a cross-sectional regression of in￿ow and out￿ow rates (adjusted using the above procedure)
on states￿ land area, number of metropolitan areas with population above 0.5 million, and year when
the state formally joined the U.S. I have then de￿ned the out￿ow and in￿ow rates to be the residuals
of this regression, and the net ￿ow rates as the diﬀerence between the two. This second adjustment
has a more sizeable eﬀect on the statistics of interest, but does not aﬀect the basic properties of
the data, either.
In￿ows and Out￿ows in the Cross-Section. Tables 1 and 2 below provides descriptive statistics
regarding in￿ow, out￿ow and net ￿ow rates across U.S. states using data from the Census 2000,
adjusted as described above.8
Table 1
Basic Statistics on Workers Flows (Census 2000)
Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Out￿ow Rate 8.86 8.67 1.54 5.46 (Wisconsin) 17.15 (Wyoming)
In￿ow Rate 8.86 8.27 3.33 4.03 (North Dakota) 28.26 (Nevada)
Net Flow Rate 0.00 −0.10 2.59 −7.99 (North Dakota) 12.51 (Nevada)
Table 2
Cross-Sectional Correlations (Census 2000)
Out￿ow Rate In￿ow Rate Net Flow Rate
Out￿ow Rate 1 0.66∗∗∗ 0.25∗
In￿ow Rate 1 0.89∗∗∗
Net Flow Rate 1
∗∗∗ denotes signi￿cant at 1% level,
∗ at 10% level
From these two Tables, some interesting facts emerge:
￿ Gross ￿ows are large relative to net ￿ows. Between 1995 and 2000 the average state gained
or lost about 2.2 percent of its 1995 population. In the same period, the average state
experienced a combined in￿ow and out￿ow of population of about 17 percent of its 1995
population (Table 1).
7The cross-sectional correlation between adjusted and unadjusted rates in the 2000 Census is always above 0.97.
8The statistics in this and the following tables are computed weighting each state by its relative population.
6￿ There is a relatively large dispersion across states in out￿ow, in￿ow and net ￿ow rates, with
out￿ow rates being relatively less dispersed than gross and net in￿ow rates (Table 1).
￿ States that experience a relative large gross in￿ow of population also tend to experience a
relatively large gross out￿ow of population (Table 2 and Figure 1). For example, the state
of Nevada ranked ￿rst in terms of gross in￿ows (about 28.26 percent) and second in terms
of gross out￿ows (15.74 percent). Interestingly, the positive correlation between gross in￿ows
and out￿ows is apparently a well-known, though not extensively documented, stylized fact
in the literature on internal migration of population (see Greenwood, 1975).9 The correla-
tions in Table 2, particularly the one between gross in￿ows and gross out￿ows, are consistent
with two polar situations. One in which the large ￿ows are symptoms of a changing indus-
try/demographic mix of the state￿s workforce, so that the outgoing workers are diﬀerent from
the incoming ones. The other in which the ￿same￿ type of worker moves in and out of the
state. In order to distinguish between these two possibilities, I have used the 490 demographic
groups (indexed by g and described above) and computed, for each state j and for the 2000
Census, the following measure of within demographic group workers￿ reallocation:10
P
g (injg + outjg) −
P
g |injg − outjg|
P








The denominator of this expression gives the diﬀerence between the sum of gross in￿ow and
out￿ow from location j and the absolute net ￿ow. Thus, it represents the excess of workers￿
mobility over and above what is needed to accommodate net workers￿ ￿ows. To understand
the numerator of equation (1), suppose that in￿ows and out￿ows of workers always occurred
between demographic groups. This means that for each group g,we would either have injg > 0
and outjg =0o rinjg =0a n doutjg > 0. In this case the numerator of (1) would be zero,
and so would the measure of within-group reallocation. At the other extreme, if in￿ows and
out￿ows were always balanced within groups (injg = outjg), then the index would be equal
to one. The out￿ows-weighted average of this measure across states for the 2000 Census was
0.91, suggesting that most ￿ows occur within the demographic/industry groups described
above. A way to consider exclusively within-group ￿ows when computing the correlations
of Table 2, is to compute the cross-sectional correlation between gross in￿ows and out￿ows
for each group separately. Then, the 490 correlation coeﬃcients can be averaged using as
weights the groups￿ population shares in the U.S. The following Table reports these adjusted
9See, for example, Miller (1967, page 1426, Table 3). She de￿nes locations in terms of metropolitan areas, instead
of states and shows, using 1960 Census data, that this correlation is robustly positive both in the aggregate and
within demographic groups de￿ned by sex, race and occupational category.
10This measure has been used, for example, by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) to decompose aggregate excess
reallocation of jobs into a between-sector and a within-sector component.
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Table 3
Adjusted Cross-Sectional Correlations (Census 2000)
Out￿ow Rate In￿ow Rate Net Flow Rate
Out￿ow Rate 1 0.39 −0.23
In￿ow Rate 1 0.79
Net Flow Rate 1
.
Comparing the correlations in Tables 2 and 3, one notices that the latter are smaller. The
signs of the correlations between gross in￿ows and out￿o w sa r et h es a m ei nb o t hT a b l e s ,w h i l e
the correlation between out￿ows and net ￿ows turns negative in Table 3. These results are
consistent with the view that some of the gross ￿ows we observe have to do with changes in
the composition of states￿ workforce. From our perspective, however, it is important that,
even within narrowly de￿ned demographic/industry groups, there is a positive correlation
between gross in￿ows and out￿ows.11
￿ Gross and net in￿ows are highly and positively correlated in the cross-section, while the
correlation between net ￿ows and gross out￿ows is in absolute value smaller (Tables 2 and 3
and Figures 2 and 3). This observation, together with the previous two, seems to suggest that
reallocation of population within the U.S. occurs mainly through variations in gross in￿ows
(large in fast-growing states and small in slow-growing states), rather than in gross out￿ows,
across states. In other words, states that tend to lose population to other states seem to do
so by attracting fewer new workers as opposed to losing more local ones.
Cross-Sections Over Time and the Time-Series Dimension of Workers￿ Flows. It is
natural to ask whether the statistics presented in the previous Tables are peculiar to the 2000
Census or not. It is also important to determine how much persistence there is in gross population
￿ows for a given state. Both questions can be answered by considering other Census years.
Tables 4 and 5 con￿rm that the salient features of gross and net ￿ows pointed out above in
relation to the 2000 Census are also present in the 1970-1990 Censuses.12,13
11For consistency, one could also adjust the cross-sectional standard deviation of ￿ow rates in Table 1 in order to
capture exclusively the dispersion of ￿ows within demographic groups, and not the cross-groups covariance terms.
By doing so, since the latter covariances tend to be negative, one would obtain higher standard deviations for in￿ow,
out￿ow, and net ￿ow rate. Their ranking does not change, though. For simplicity, I do not carry out this further
adjustment.
12Extending the analysis before 1970 presents some diﬃculty. The 1960 Census does not report a person￿s state of
residence in 1955, but only if the person migrated across states or not. Thus, in 1960 it is only possible to compute
gross in￿ows, but not gross out￿ows or net ￿ows. In the 1950 Census, the migration question pertains to one year
before, rather than 5 years before. I exploit the 1950 Census year in Table 6 below. The 1940 Census does not present
particular problems.
13For simplicity, given that the ￿r s tt y p eo fa d j u s t m e n tm e n t i o n e da b o v e( f o rc o m p o s i t i o ne ﬀects related to age,
education and industry of employment) did not produce any sizeable eﬀect on the statistics of Tables 1 and 2, in this
Table the data for 1970-2000 are only subject to the second type of adjustment mentioned above. This explains the
diﬀerence between the results in Table 1 and the one in this Table for the 2000 Census.
8Table 4
Basic Statistics on Population Flows (Censuses 1970-2000)
2000 1990 1980 1970
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Out￿ow Rate 8.59 1.50 9.04 2.01 8.97 1.77 6.89 1.72
In￿ow Rate 8.59 3.22 9.04 3.90 8.97 3.86 6.89 2.73
Net Flow Rate 0.00 2.60 0.00 3.84 0.00 3.06 0.00 2.39
Table 5
Cross-Sectional Correlations (Censuses 1970-1990)
Out￿ow Rate In￿ow Rate Net Flow Rate
Out￿ow Rate
1970 1 0.50∗∗∗ -0.15
1980 1 0.63∗∗∗ 0.22
1990 1 0.29∗∗ -0.23






∗∗∗ signi￿cant at 1% level.
∗∗ signi￿cant at 5% level.
Do states with relatively high gross and net ￿ows between 1995 and 2000, also tend to display
relatively high ￿ows between 1985 and 1990, and before? The answer to this question is aﬃrmative
for both gross and net ￿ows. The following Table reports, for each type of ￿ow, its autocorrelation
coeﬃcient across Census years, computed by pooling all state-year data points together.14
14In order to increase the sample size in the time-series dimension, I have included the 1950 Census in these
computations. The 1950 Census asked respondents to report their state of residence in 1949, as opposed to 1945.
The 1 year migration data were converted into 5 year migration data by multiplying the 1 year ￿ows by 4.538. This
number guarantees that the cross-sectional standard deviation of net ￿ow rates in 1950 is the same as the average
standard deviation in all the previous Census years. Notice that in Table 6 the diﬀerence between t and t − 1i s
equivalent to 10 years.
9Table 6
Autocorrelations of Population Flows (Censuses 1950, 1970-2000)
Autocorrelation Coeﬃcient
t,t − 1 t,t − 2 t,t − 3 t,t − 4 t,t − 5
Out￿ow Rate 0.66∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗
In￿ow Rate 0.86∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗
Net Flow Rate 0.73∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
∗∗∗ signi￿cant at 1% level.
Notice that all these ￿ow rates are very persistent over time.
Migration Motives. Not all moves of workers across states are motivated by economic reasons.
The Census survey does not contain any question regarding a worker￿s reason for the change of
residence. However, since 1999, the March CPS has asked this question. I have aggregated the
diﬀerent answers to this question into two categories, according to whether an interstate move is
attributable or not to economic factors. The appendix provides more information about the criteria
used for this assignment. About two thirds of all interstate moves that occurred between 1999 and
2003, according to the March CPS, were of the ￿rst kind.
Earnings. Using the 2000 Census I have constructed a measure of a worker￿s weekly earnings in
1999. These nominal ￿gures were de￿ated using the ACCRA cost of living index, which measures
the relative price of a given basket of goods and services in a number of U.S. cities.15 Denote the
real weekly earnings of worker i in 1999 by wi. The Census data provides detailed information
regarding a worker￿s demographic characteristics, occupation and industry. Let these observables
be summarized by the vector xi. In order to construct measures of average wages within states and
of residual wage inequality, I have run the following regression for log earnings:
lnwi = ￿ ￿ STATEi + ω ￿ MOVEi + xiβ + εi, (2)
where STATEi is a vector of dummy variables recording individual￿s i state of residence in 2000,
while MOVEi is a dummy variable that equals one if worker i moved across state lines sometimes
between 1995 and 2000 and zero otherwise.16 The estimates of this regression reveal two interesting
15See the appendix for more detail on this index. Due to limitations in the availability of this index, the size of
the sample used to carry out the computations of this section is about 50 percent of the original sample size used in
previous sections. However, it still includes about 2.5 million observations.
16As Kennan and Walker (2005) point out, the residual εi can be interpreted as re￿ecting the in￿uence of (at
least) three orthogonal factors on a worker￿s earnings: a location match component (which varies across locations
for the same worker, but is constant within locations), a worker￿s ￿xed eﬀect (which is constant within and across
locations for a given worker), and a transitory eﬀect (which varies both within and across locations for a given
worker). Location-speci￿ce ﬀects on earnings are a key determinant of migration decisions, in addition to diﬀerences
in average earnings across states. Of course, the cross-sectional nature of the Census data does not allow one to
separately identify the three components of residual wages. Fortunately, Kennan and Walker (2005, page 11) provide
such decomposition using NLSY data. According to their estimates, location eﬀects explain about 16 percent of the
overall inequality in residual earnings among young high school educated workers.
10facts. First, controlling for observables, the standard deviation of weekly earnings across states is
about 11 percent of average weekly earnings in the U.S.17 Second, the estimate of ω in equation
(2) suggests that the weekly earnings of workers that have moved across state lines in the 5 years
preceding the 2000 Census are about 1.8 percent lower than the weekly earnings of observationally
equivalent workers who did not move during that period and lived in the same location in 2000.
This evidence is consistent with the view that migrating workers are on average less productive
than non-migrating ones in their new location of choice. The model introduced in the next section
is consistent with this evidence.
3M o d e l
The model presented in this section builds on the island-model of the labor market developed
by Lucas and Prescott (1974). The force that drives the dynamics of the local labor market
in the model is a persistent labor demand shock.18 Relatively high labor demand shocks generate
temporary increases in local wages that are then followed by net in￿ows of workers. Simultaneously,
idiosyncratic wage shocks give rise to workers￿ gross ￿ows. In equilibrium, the value of migrating
from one labor market to another is pinned down by the requirement that aggregate net ￿ows of
workers are zero.
The economy is populated by a continuum of measure one of locations (islands). A location is
denoted by j ∈ [0,1]. All locations are ex-ante identical. Ex-post, locations diﬀer because they are
hit by diﬀerent labor demand shocks, denoted by zjt,w h e r et indexes time.19 An agent i located
in period t in a location j has earnings υijwjt. The latter are the product of two components.
First, υij is an idiosyncratic component which, as in Kennan and Walker (2005), represents the
eﬃciency units of labor with which the worker is endowed in the location. These eﬃciency units
remain the same as long as the agent stays in the same location. Second, wjt represents the unit
price of an eﬃciency unit of labor in location j. I ti sc o m m o nt oa l lw o r k e r sl i v i n gi nl o c a t i o nj
and it changes over time with the local labor market conditions. An agent can freely move across
islands to improve his idiosyncratic match υij and the unit price of labor wjt.20
In detail, the sequence of events is as follows:
￿ An agent i is born in a location j at the end of period t − 1.












. Notice that in computing this number I am imposing
the same vector of observables in all states.
18The next section argues that the model would yield the same implications for workers ￿ows if it were driven by
shocks to local amenities.
19In this model I abstract from unemployment. The ￿ow data from the Census describe interstate moves at ￿ve
years intervals, so a model￿s period will represent ￿ve years. Given that most unemployment spells last only a few
weeks, this would create problems in numerically implementing the model. Lkhagvasuren (2005) considers a model
that explicitly allows for unemployment in order to explain the large observed cross-state diﬀerences in unemployment
rates.
20Including an explicit moving cost in the model would be straightforward. The only reason why it is not included
is that the Census data used in this paper would not allow me to identify this parameter.
11￿ At the beginning of t, the agent draws the idiosyncratic location-match υij from the two-point
distribution (υl,υh), whose mean is normalized to one. The individual productivity shock
υij and the local unit price of labor wjt determine his wage wijt = υijwjt.
￿ The agent receives a utility ￿ow wijt.
￿ With probability 1 − δ the agent dies and is replaced by another agent that will start his
life in the same location at the beginning of period t + 1. With probability δ < 1 the agent
survives into the next period.
￿ If the agent survives, he can then decide whether to stay in location j or move to another
location. The information available to the agent when making this choice will be speci￿ed
later. He if decides to move he obtains expected utility e.
￿ At the beginning of period t +1 , if the agent had remained in the same location j in which
he was living in t, he receives momentary utility υijwjt+1. If the agent has moved to a new
location j0, he draws a new idiosyncratic location-match υij0 from the same distribution as
new-born agents.
Production. Aggregate output in location j at time t, denoted by ajt, is produced according to
the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
ajt = zjtlτ
jt, τ ∈ (0,1), (3)
where ljt represents labor, measured in eﬃciency units and zjt is a shock to the productivity of
labor located in j at time t. This production function embeds the assumption that there is a ￿xed
factor of production, e.g. land, that gives rise to decreasing returns to scale at the local level. This
assumption is necessary to guarantee that each location has a ￿nite population at each point in
time. The production function (3) is consistent with two alternative (and extreme) assumptions
about capital mobility. Speci￿cally, physical capital can be thought of as either being permanently
￿xed in all locations or as being perfectly mobile across locations. In the latter case, physical
capital would move to equalize its expected marginal product across locations. The speci￿cation
(3) represents the reduced form taken by the production function after the optimal amount of
physical capital has been replaced back into its original speci￿cation.










where ρ ∈ (−1,1) and ujt is independent and identically distributed both over time and across
locations. Let q(u) denote the density of this shock and normalize its mean to one. The speci￿cation
of the exogenous shocks in equations (4) and (5) is non-standard because it assumes that the
innovations εjt in (4) are persistent, as opposed to being identically distributed over time as in
12standard speci￿cations. Persistence in the process followed by εjt is necessary in order to generate
persistent net ￿ows in the Lucas-Prescott model. If ρ were equal to zero, net ￿ows would be
negatively autocorrelated over time, which is strongly at odds with the data.21 The timing of
the model is such that zjt is realized at the beginning of period t, after period t − 1￿s migration
decisions have been made. Thus, a migrating agent only knows the expected value of location-
speci￿c productivity shocks.
The eﬃciency units of labor ljt located in j at time t are:
ljt = yjtυjt,
where yjt represents the measure of workers located in j at the beginning of t and υjt denotes the
eﬃciency units per worker in that location. Speci￿cally:
υjt = υlλjt + υh (1 − λjt), (6)
where λjt denotes the fraction of agents located in j at the beginning of t characterized by an
idiosyncratic match value υl.
Firms￿ optimization yields the market wage rate per eﬃciency unit of labor:
wjt = τzjtlτ−1
jt . (7)
Workers￿ Flows. Let xjt and ojt denote respectively gross in￿ows and out￿ows occurring between
t and t +1 ,a n dyjt+1 denotes the population located in j at the beginning of t +1 . W i t ht h i s
notation, we can write the law of motion of population in a location:
yjt+1 = yjt + xjt − ojt. (8)
By de￿nition xjt,o jt ≥ 0. In each period t, there are three categories of workers who might leave
al o c a t i o nj:1 .( 1 − δ)yjt−1 workers born in j at the end of t − 1, 2. immigrants who arrived in
j at the end of t − 1, 3. residents of j who were also living in j in t − 1. Notice that the only
reason why an agent with idiosyncratic shock υh might leave a location j is to obtain a higher unit
price of labor. Instead, an agent with idiosyncratic shock υl m i g h tw a n tt ol e a v et oi m p r o v eh i s
match and/or to get a higher price of labor. In what follows, I will show how, given the absence of
mobility costs, an agent with shock υl will always ￿nd it more convenient to leave a location than
to stay. An agent with shock υh instead will leave only if the price of labor in a location becomes
low enough. In that case he will have to be indiﬀerent between staying and leaving. Let qjt denote
the probability that an agent with match υh leaves a location. Let njt−1 denote the sum of gross
in￿ows and new born workers:
njt−1 = xjt−1 +( 1− δ)yjt−1.
21An alternative way of obtaining persistent net ￿ows would be to introduce less-than-perfect capital mobility in
the model, as opposed to the current setting in which capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile. The parameter
governing capital adjustment costs would then determine the extent of autocorrelation in net ￿ows. Given this, I
choose the simpler speci￿cation in which the shock process is characterized by persistent innovations.
13Then, gross out￿ows from location j between t and t +1a r e :
ojt = δpnjt−1 + δ (yjt − pnjt−1)qjt, (9)
with qjt ∈ [0,1].
Given that individuals with a low match υl always migrate, the measure λjt of agents located





Recursive Formulation of Individual Mobility Problem. The state vector for an agent
located in a location j is given by
s =( y,n−1,z,ε),
where I have dropped the subscript j for simplicity. Then, the value function of a worker charac-














where the expectation on the right-hand side of the Bellman equation is taken with respect to the
endogenous distribution of the state vector s. Using equations (6), (7) and (10), the unit price of
labor is:
w(s)=τz [υlpn−1 + υh (y − pn−1)]
τ−1 .
Consider now, agents with a low idiosyncratic component υl. These agents will always want to
migrate to improve their idiosyncratic match. To see this, notice that there is no cost of moving,
so that the only reason to stay in a location for one of these agents is a high unit price of labor.
Locations with the highest unit price of labor will attract migrating workers. The latter have an
expected utility of moving into one such location equal to e. It follows that a worker with match
υl living in such location must have an expected utility lower than e. This implies that he is better
oﬀ migrating than staying in that location. Thus, the Bellman equation for this worker is:
V (s,υl;e)=υlw(s)+βδe.
As far as the agents for whom υ = υh are concerned, following Lucas and Prescott (1974), we
need to distinguish among three diﬀerent cases:
￿ Case A. Some (or all) of these workers leave and some (or none) remain. In this case, the
remaining workers must obtain at least as much as the departing ones. The latter obtain, in










where the endogenous components of s0 are:
n =( 1 − δ)y,
y0 =
‰
y(1 − δq(s)) − δpn−1 (1 − q(s)) if (11) holds with equality,
y(1 − δ) if (11) does not hold with equality
.
Notice that q(s) ≤ 1i si m p l i c i t l yd e ￿ned by (11) in case of equality.



























The ￿rst inequality expresses the fact that it is better for a υh type of worker to remain in the
location, while the second inequality expresses the fact that no migrating worker will choose
to migrate to this location. The endogenous components of s0 are:
n =( 1 − δ)y,




























e(1 − pβδ) − pυlE [w(s0)|s]
1 − p
.



























The endogenous components of s0 are:
n =( 1 − δ)y + x(s),
y0 = y + x(s) − δpn−1,
where x(s)i si m p l i c i t l yd e ￿n e db ye q u a t i o n( 1 4 ) .














where s0 is such that
n =( 1 − δ)y +m a x{e x(s),0},
y0 = y +m a x{e x(s),0} − δpn−1,










e(1 − pβδ) − pυlE [w(s0)|s]
1 − p
(15)
15when s0 is such that
n =( 1 − δ)y + e x(s),
y0 = y + e x(s) − δpn−1.
In words, if e x(s), implicitly de￿ned by condition (15), is negative, it must be that there is no
incentive for migrating workers to choose this location because their expected utility upon receiving
the shock υh (left-hand side of 15) would fall short of what is required to induce a positive gross
￿ow (right-hand side of 15). In this case nobody enters the location.
After having found the value function that solves the problem of a worker with shock υh, one
can use equation (15) to solve for gross in￿ows:
x(s)=m a x{e x(s),0}.












n = y(1 − δ),
y0 = y(1 − δ).
Instead, if (11) holds with equality:
q(s)=m a x{e q(s),0},











n =( 1 − δ)y,
y0 = y(1 − δe q(s)) − δpn−1 (1 − e q(s)).
Stationary Equilibrium. The solution to the mobility problem in a location determines the
law of motion of the endogenous variables of the state vector s. These laws of motion de￿ne the
probability, denoted by Ψ(y0,n|s), that next period￿s population in the location is less than y0 and
gross in￿ows are less than n, given a state s this period. A stationary distribution of s is then a
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,
16and Q is the cdf of the shock u.
The stationary distribution Φ depends on the endogenous variable e. The expected utility of
migration must be such that the sum of population across locations equals the aggregate population:
Z
yφy (y)dy =1 , (16)
where φy denotes the marginal density of y.
4 Discussion
Before proceeding it is worth discussing some of the modelling choices that I have made.
Demand vs. Supply Shocks. The ￿rst modelling choice is that the driving force of the model
is represented by local labor demand shocks, as opposed to local labor supply shocks. In doing so,
I am not considering the possibility that the high net in￿ows of population experienced by states
such as Nevada and Arizona in recent decades, might be driven by local amenities (e.g. warm
winters). It turns out that this choice, while being empirically supported, is not restrictive. It is
in fact possible to add amenities to the model of section (3) and show that it gives rise to identical
implications for gross and net ￿ows as the model driven exclusively by demand shocks. To do
this, let a location j be characterized at time t + 1 by a vector of amenities kjt+1 which can vary
stochastically over time.22 Assume that amenities aﬀect agents￿ utility in a multiplicative fashion.
An agent with match shock υ that lives in a location where the wage per eﬃciency unit of labor
is wjt has instantaneous utility υwjth(kjt). It follows that in this setting h(kjt) can play the same
role as the labor demand shock zjt.
The upshot of this discussion is that the model with amenities produces qualitatively identical
implications for workers￿ ￿ows as the model driven by labor demand shocks. In order to solve
this identi￿cation problem, it is necessary to consider the relationship between real earnings and
net ￿ows. If the driving force of workers￿ ￿ows were amenity shocks, one would expect a negative
cross-sectional correlation between real earnings and net ￿ows of workers.
The available evidence seems, prima facie, to suggest against this hypothesis. Table 7 reports
the cross-sectional correlation coeﬃcients among the following state-level variables: gross in￿ows,
gross out￿ows, net ￿ows, average (log) real weekly earnings (these four variables are from the 2000
Census), annual heating and cooling-degree days.23
22For example, the introduction of air conditioning has signi￿cantly improved living conditions in the South-West
of the U.S. during summer months. This can be interpreted as a change in k.
23Ih a v eu s e dt h ed u m m yc o e ﬃcient ￿j as a measure of average (log) weekly earnings in state j in 1999. The annual
number of cooling and heating degree-days are from the U.S. Historical Climatography Series 5-2 and 5-1. They are
averages over the period 1931-2000. Given that there might be considerable within-state variation in temperature,
the series are constructed using a population-weighted aggregate temperature for each state, with weights given by
the Census 2000 population. The number of annual cooling and heating degree-days for a state j in year t are de￿ned
17Table 7
Cross-Sectional Correlations (Census 2000)
Out￿ow In￿ow Net Flow Average Log Cooling Heating
Rate Rate Rate Wages Degree Days Degree Days
Out￿ow Rate 1 0.66∗∗∗ 0.25∗ −0.17 0.25∗ −0.31∗∗
In￿ow Rate 1 0.89∗∗∗ 0.25∗ 0.46∗∗∗ −0.47∗∗∗
Net Flow Rate 1 0.43∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ −0.42∗∗∗
Average Log Wages 1 0.37∗∗∗ −0.25∗
Cooling Degree Days 1 −0.81∗∗∗
Heating Degree Days 1
∗∗∗ signi￿cant at 1% level,
∗∗ signi￿cant at 5% level,
∗ signi￿cant at 10% level.
The Table clearly show how states with larger positive net ￿ows of workers tend to be character-
ized by relatively higher real earnings (Figure 4).24 These are also the states with better amenities,
as measured by the number of cooling and heating degree-days (Figure 5). These correlations are,
prima facie, inconsistent with theories that postulate the existence of compensating diﬀerentials in
earnings across locations (see e.g., Roback (1982)).
Of course, the question of why certain states experience large positive and persistent labor
demand shocks remains open. No attempt is made to answer this diﬃcult question in this paper.
T h ea p p r o a c ht a k e nh e r ew i l lb et o￿rst use these net ￿ows to back out the underlying local labor
demand shocks. These shocks will then be fed into the model and the latter will be evaluated on
the basis of its cross-sectional implications for the gross ￿ows of workers.
The Land Market. It is simple to modify the economy of section (3) to include a housing
market. Assume, for example, that agents care about the consumption good c and housing services
h, according to the instantaneous utility function:
u(c,h)=cαh1−α.
The budget constraint of an agent located in j with match υij becomes:
c + pjth = wjtυij,
where pjt denotes the price of a unit of housing services. The latter are equal to the amount of land
the agent decides to rent. Land is also used in production. Firms demand land to the point where
as:








where xjtd is the average daily temperature in day d of year t in state j.
24A similar conclusion has also been reached by Topel (1986) and Blanchard and Katz (1992), who ￿nd it more
support for local shocks to labor demand as the driving force behind net ￿ows of workers across states.
18its marginal product equals pjt. In equilibrium, pjt must be such that the demand for land for
residential and business purposes equals its ￿xed supply. This version of the model can be solved
along the same lines of the benchmark. Ignoring binding constraints on gross in￿ows of workers,
for simplicity, the model with land would be characterized by the following key property. Agents
would move across locations to equalize the expected value of unit labor prices wjt de￿ated by a
measure of the price level. For example, solving the agent￿s static optimization problem above and





Net ￿ows across locations would then equalize the expected value of wjt+1/p1−α
jt+1 across locations. In
this version of the model net and gross ￿ows would have the same properties as in the benchmark.25
Persistent Diﬀerences Across States. A crucial aspect of the modelling strategy concerns the
nature of heterogeneity across states. The model above describes a stationary economy in which
all locations are ex-ante identical.D i ﬀerences across locations are persistent but not permanent. In
particular, a location￿s population share and earnings per capita tend to return over time to their
long-run value, which is common across locations. This modelling choice, although convenient for
many reasons, deserves some further comment.
Consider ￿rst the evidence concerning per-capita income or wages. Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1992) and (1991), using state-level data dating back to 1840, have shown how states with lower
initial incomes per capita have subsequently grown faster towards a common income level than
initially richer states.26 Blanchard and Katz (1992) also ￿nd strong evidence of convergence of
manufacturing wages across U.S. states in the post-WWII period. Diﬀerently from Barro and Sala-
Martin, though, in their empirical and theoretical analysis, Blanchard and Katz specify states￿
relative wages as stationary processes around state-speci￿cm e a n s . 27
Blanchard and Katz (1992, page 5) also document that, for the period 1950-1990, ￿U.S. states
have experienced large and sustained diﬀerences in employment growth rates.￿ They capture this
observation in a formal way by modelling the growth rates of states￿ employment shares as stationary
processes with state-speci￿c means. Of course, since a state￿s employment share is bounded from
above by one this formalization cannot be taken literally, but just as a convenient way of capturing
the persistent diﬀerences in employment growth across states. This speci￿cation is not problematic
for Blanchard and Katz because, in their reduced form model, they never impose the condition that
the employment shares must be smaller than one. In the model above, instead, employment shares,
rather than their ￿rst diﬀerences, are assumed to be stationary. This is a necessary assumption
for a well-de￿ned equilibrium. Of course, it is always possible to set the parameters controlling
the degree of mean reversion to a small enough value, so that in practice it might be impossible to
25In principle, the model￿s implications for land prices and nominal wages could be separately tested, a step that
might be taken in future research.
26To be more precise, Barro and Sala-i-Martin￿s evidence points to what is usually called in the growth literature
￿β-convergence￿. The latter denotes the tendency for states with lower incomes per capita to grow faster than states
in which income per capita is relatively large.
27It is worth noticing that both Barro and Sala-i-Martin and Blanchard and Katz cannot control for diﬀerences in
price levels across states.
19distinguish one speci￿cation from the other. In summary, both with respect to relative wages and
employment shares, I interpret observed diﬀerences across states as stemming from slow transitions,
rather than from time-invariant features.
Firms￿ Mobility vs. Workers Mobility. The model of the previous section abstracts from
capital. This is without loss of generality. It is easy to introduce perfect capital in the production
function. The latter would then imply the equalization of the marginal product of capital across
locations. This marginal product condition can then be used to solve for the amount of capital
in each location as a function of its eﬃciency units of labor. The location￿s capital stock can be
replaced in the original production function, leading to a new production function that depends
only on labor.28
The Labor Market. In the model of the previous section, two types of agents are active in the
l a b o rm a r k e ta tap o i n ti nt i m e .T h e￿rst one is young individuals that are ￿just born￿, and draw
their ￿rst wage shock. The second is movers from other locations who draw new wage shocks. As
in Kennan and Walker (2005), an important assumption here is that there is no search at the local
level, i.e., workers sample from the local wage oﬀer distribution only once. This is a way to capture
the fact that there is a local component to wages. For example, a company￿s manager might realize
that he cannot advance in his career in the current location, but can move within the company to
ad i ﬀerent location, be promoted and given a salary raise. In the model the worker has to move
to ￿nd out what his wage will be in the new location. While this is unlikely to be true in most
cases, the worker is moving to a new job and there is going to be uncertainty regarding the job￿s
features (colleagues, working hours, possibility of further advancements, etc.). This uncertainty
generates uncertainty in wages, as the latter might reveal ex-post to be too low, given the job￿s
characteristics.
5 Empirical Implementation
The model￿s parameters are estimated using the method of simulated moments (see Lee and Ingram,
1991 and Duﬃe and Singleton, 1993). When bringing the model to the data, one has to keep in
mind that the model assumes the existence of a continuum of locations, and therefore a constant
value of migration e. The empirical and arti￿cial moments were, instead, constructed using data
from 48 U.S. states. The assumption of a continuum of location is mainly for feasibility: allowing
for a ￿nite number of locations in the theoretical model would make it virtually impossible to
solve because a worker in a location would have to take into account the full distribution of the
28Lee (2004) provides comprehensive evidence regarding plant relocation in the manufacturing sector for the period
1972-1992. He ￿nds (page 17) that, in a ￿ve-year period, ￿plant relocations account for about 7 percent of variations
in net employment growth across states. The remaining 93 percent is accounted for by within-state changes such as
employment growth within continuing plants, de novo plant openings, permanent closings without relocation, and
intrastate plant relocation.￿ This evidence suggests that movements of existing plants play a relatively minor role in
explaining the diﬀerential growth of states￿ employment. It does not rule out, though, that the opening of new plants
could play a much more signi￿cant role. Blanchard and Katz (1992) provide evidence that suggests that neither plant
relocation nor new plant openings play an important role in states￿ adjustment to local labor demand shocks. They
estimate local labor demand equations and ￿nd that local employment reacts strongly to local labor demand shocks,
while job creation responds weakly to movements in local wages.
20state vector s across all other locations when solving his dynamic programming problem. In other
words, e would become a function of the distribution of state vectors s across states. In practice,
this discrepancy between the theory and the empirical implementation of the model is unlikely to be
of any importance for two reasons. First, in the data the cross-sectional properties of gross and net
￿ows tend to be very similar across Census decades, as predicted by the model with a continuum
of locations. Second, and more important, the moments computed using the data generated by the
model are robust to an increase in the number of locations above 48.
A period in the model is taken to represent 5 years. The discounting parameters β and δ and
the production function parameter τ are set a-priori. The discount factor β is set equal to 0.82,
implying a yearly interest rate 1/β of 4 percent. An individual￿s working life in the data I consider
is about 30 years, or 6 model-periods. Thus, I set the constant probability of survival δ equal to
0.83, so that the average lifetime for an individual in the model is approximately 6 periods. Finally,
the parameter τ is set to 2/3, which corresponds to the income share of labor in Gross Domestic
Product.
The remaining parameters are (ρ,ψ,υl,p) and the parameter of the density q(u). The latter





− 1. The parameter vector θ =
(ρ,σu,ψ,υl,p) is estimated by matching ￿ve moments constructed from the Census data.29 The
following table summarizes the model￿s parameters and their estimated values:
Table 8
Model￿s Parameters
Parameter How it is set Estimate
β discount factor a-priori 0.820
δ probability of death a-priori 0.830
τ labor share in output a-priori 0.670
ψ mean-reversion parameter for zjt estimated 0.992
ρ ￿rst order autocorrelation of εjt estimated 0.950
σu volatility of labor demand shock estimated 0.300
υl value of low idiosyncratic shock estimated 0.968
p probability of low idiosyncratic shock estimated 0.364
.
The identi￿cation of the parameters is discussed below. First, ρ, σu and ψ are estimated by
matching some of the cross-sectional and time-series moments of states￿ net in￿ow rates. Using
four decades of Census data (1970-2000), I construct a panel of 4 observations on net in￿ow rates
for each of the 48 contiguous U.S. states. I then consider the following three moments: the cross-
sectional standard deviation of these net in￿ow rates in the 2000 Census (0.0259) and the ￿rst
and second order autocorrelation coeﬃcients of net in￿ow rates across Census years (0.73 and 0.61,
29The parameter υh is determined from p and υl from the normalization setting the unconditional mean of υ to
zero. The appendix provides a detailed description of the numerical algorithm followed to estimate the parameters
and solve the model.
21respectively).30 When constructing the model counterpart of these moments, it is important to
consider the fact that the Census data are only available every ten years, while a model￿s period is
equivalent to ￿ve years. Thus, in the estimation algorithm, the net in￿ow rates predicted by the
model must be sampled every two model-periods.
Second, the parameter p determines the probability of drawing a low idiosyncratic shock. Since
agents drawing these shocks always choose to migrate, the parameter p is set to match the observed
interstate migration rate in the U.S. economy, in the 1995-2000 period. From Table 1, this value is
8.86 percent.
Last, the parameter υl determines the relative earnings of migrants and incumbent workers in
a location. Given that workers with low matches always leave a location, the incumbents are all
characterized by a high match υh. Instead, a fraction p of incoming workers is characterized by a
match υl and a fraction 1 − p by υh. The parameter υl is identi￿ed by the estimated coeﬃcient
b ω in the log wage regression (2). Given the simple structure of the model this parameter can be
compute analytically. In fact, from section (2), the wage of migrants was about 1.8 percent percent
lower than the wage of stayers in the location of destination. Thus:
pυl +( 1− p)υh
υh
=0 .982. (17)
Recall that the average eﬃciency units of incoming workers (the numerator of equation 17) have
been normalized to one. Thus, we obtain υh and υl:
υh =0 .982−1,
υl =
1 − (1 − p)0.982−1
p
.
6R e s u l t s
The following Tables represents the main cross-sectional and time-series statistics produced by the




Mean St. Deviation Corr. Out￿ow Corr. In￿ow Corr. Av. Wage
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Out￿ow Rate 8.86 8.86 1.54 0.84 11 0.39 0.88 −0.170 .06
In￿ow Rate 8.86 8.86 3.33 3.28 0.39 0.88 11 0.25 0.11
Net Flow Rate 0.00 0.00 2.59 2.59 −0.23 0.81 0.79 0.99 0.43 0.12
30The ￿rst order autocorrelation coeﬃcient has been computed by calculating the correlation between the vector
of net ￿ow rates in 2000, 1990 and 1980 and the lagged vector containing the net ￿ow rates in 1990, 1980, and 1970.
The second order autocorrelation coeﬃcient has been computed in an analogous way.
22Table 10
Autocorrelations of Population Flows
Autocorrelation Coeﬃcients
t,t − 1 t,t − 2 t,t − 3
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Out￿ow Rate 0.66 0.68 0.68 0.55 0.29 0.46
In￿ow Rate 0.86 0.82 0.71 0.66 0.56 0.57
Net Flow Rate 0.73 0.73 0.61 0.61 0.55 0.51
.
The simulated model is generally consistent with the main stylized facts reviewed in section (2).
In particular, in the cross section, gross in￿ows are predicted to be more dispersed than net in￿ows
while the latter are predicted to be more dispersed than gross out￿ows. In addition, gross in￿ows
and out￿ows and gross and net in￿ows are positively correlated in the cross section. However, the
model incorrectly predicts that gross out￿ows should be positively correlated with net ￿ows. In
the time-series dimension all ￿ows are very persistent. Last, states characterized by positive net
￿ows also tend to have relatively high average wages, even if the model understates the magnitude
of this correlation. In order to gain a better understanding of the working of the model, it is useful
to consider the impulse response functions of workers ￿ows to a labor productivity shock.
The Mechanics of Workers￿ Flows. Figure 6 plots the period-by-period response of out￿ow,
in￿ow and net ￿ow rates (represented as deviations from their steady state values) to a one-time
unanticipated shock uj1 > 1. In detail:
￿ In period 1 gross out￿ows stay constant at their steady state level, while at the end of period
1, there is a net in￿ow of workers who are attracted by the expected positive conditions of the
local labor market for period 2.31 Thus, gross in￿ows increase by exactly the same amount
as net in￿ows.
￿ In period 2, the shock uj2 is back to 1. Net ￿ow rates, however, are driven by the expected
growth in zjt. Given that the growth rate shock εjt+1 is positively autocorrelated, net ￿ows
in period 2 are also above their steady state value. Gross out￿ows tend to rise above steady
state due to the relatively large gross in￿ow of workers in the previous period. Some of these
workers, in fact, are ex-post unlucky (i.e. they draw an idiosyncratic shock υl) and decide
to migrate again. Notice that the incoming workers leave the location at the same rate as
individuals that are just born in the location. What makes the out￿ow rate increase is that
the average out￿ow rate for the local economy as a whole is a weighted average of the out￿ow
rate of incoming and new born agents (p) and incumbent agents. Since the incumbents￿
out￿ow rate is zero, the average out￿ow rate increases after an increase in gross in￿ows. As
a result, the gross in￿ow rate in period 2 exceeds the net in￿ow rate.
31Remember that the timing of the model is such that workers cannot, by assumption, move in from other locations
to take advantage of the positive labor market conditions in period 1.
23￿ The following periods are similar to period 2, with net ￿ows moving back toward steady state,
gross ￿ows exceeding steady state, and gross in￿ows exceeding net in￿ows.
The response to a negative productivity shock can be of two types. First, if the shock is not
too large, the impulse response is simply the negative of the one plotted in Figure 6, with net ￿ows
dropping, out￿ows remaining constant on impact and gross in￿ows tracking net ￿ows. Notice that
in this situation, as in the one above, badly matched agents account for the entire gross out￿ow
from the location. If, however, the negative shock is large enough in absolute value, then gross
in￿ows go to zero on impact. In this case the local economy reaches a corner solution and highly
matched incumbent workers (i.e. those characterized by idiosyncratic shock υh)m i g h tc h o o s et o
leave the location. This situation is represented in Figure 7. The ￿gure shows a simulation of
gross in￿ow and out￿ow rates over time, with in￿ows hitting zero in period 10. In this case, about
nine percent of the highly matched agents choose to migrate out of the location, giving rise to an
outburst of out￿ows. Notice that, except for these occasional spikes in out￿ows, the out￿ow series
is smoother than the in￿ow series.
What moments does this adjustment path imply? Compare ￿rst the standard deviation of net
in￿ow, gross in￿ow and gross out￿ow rates. On impact, following the positive labor demand shock,
net in￿ows rise while gross out￿ows remain constant. Over time gross out￿ows respond to the higher
in￿ow of workers. The fact that gross out￿ows are above steady state in the periods following the
shock implies that gross in￿ows exceed net in￿ows. Thus, gross in￿ows are more volatile than net
in￿ows, and the latter are more volatile than gross out￿ows. In terms of correlations, in the period
following the shock all three ￿ows tend to move together leading to a high correlation between any
t w oo ft h e m .I nt h ed a t ao n l yg r o s sa n dn e ti n ￿ows are highly correlated. Gross in￿ows and out￿ows
are positively correlated, but less than the amount predicted by the model. The latter predicts
that net ￿o w sa n dg r o s so u t ￿ows are positively correlated in the cross-section, while they tend
to be slightly negatively correlated in the data. Finally, gross and net ￿ows are highly positively
correlated over time in the model and in the data.
Average Wages. Consider now the eﬀect of a positive productivity shock occurring in period 1
on average local wages. The latter can be decomposed into the unit price of labor and the average
eﬃciency units in the location:
lnwjt | {z }
unit price of labor
+ λjtlogυl +( 1− λjt)logυh | {z }
average eﬃciency units
. (18)
First, the unit price of labor in period 1, wj1, rises on impact, because of the unanticipated nature
of the shock. In response to this shock, there will be a gross in￿ow of workers in the location. This
in￿ow lowers the marginal product of labor and brings wjt back to its steady state value starting
from period 2. The unit price of labor is shown as the dashed line in Figure 8.
Second, the in￿ow of workers has also an eﬀect on the average eﬃciency units in the location
(the second term in equation (18)). The workers that ￿ow into the location in period 1 (together
with the ones born at the end of period 1) draw idiosyncratic shocks in period 2. The average
idiosyncratic match drawn by this class of workers equals 1. In contrast, due to the selection
24associated with workers￿ moving decisions, all other workers are characterized, at beginning of
period 2, by a high match υh with the location. It follows that a positive shock to the location￿s
productivity in period 1 will induce an increase in the proportion λj2 of low matches and therefore
a fall in the average eﬃciency units of labor.32 This second eﬀect, represented by the dotted line
in Figure 8, is however quantitatively very small. It follows that the impulse response of average
wages tracks closely the impulse response of the unit price of labor.
7 The Value of Excess Workers￿ Flows
The estimated parameters can be used to compute the welfare eﬀect of eliminating excess workers
￿ows, i.e. the diﬀerence between gross ￿ows and absolute net ￿ows, in this economy. This exer-
cise parallels Jovanovic and Moﬃt (1990)￿s computation of the value of job-speci￿c information
accumulated by workers. In my model, excess ￿ows of workers across states are due to workers￿
learning about their idiosyncratic productivity in diﬀerent locations. To measure the contribution
of this information to aggregate output, I consider a version of the model in which workers are all
identical ex-ante and ex-post and characterized by one unit of eﬃciency. This is just the uncondi-
tional average of υl and υh. By construction, then, all matches between workers and locations are
identical, and workers will only move from a location in order to earn a higher unit price of labor.
The equilibrium in this alternative setting is easy to characterize. Notice, in fact, that there are
no direct mobility costs in this economy. Thus, a worker will always choose to move away from
al o c a t i o nt h a to ﬀers a lower expected unit price of labor than what can be obtained elsewhere.
It follows that in the equilibrium of this alternative model expected unit prices of labor will be










where the left-hand side is the expected price of labor in a location characterized by current state s,
and the right-hand side is the ￿o wv a l u eo fm o v i n gt oad i ﬀerent location oﬀering expected utility














where E [z0|z,ε] denotes the expectation of z0 conditional on z and ε.
In order to obtain the equilibrium value of e, it is enough to replace this equation in the














32It follows that the incoming workers will have, on average, lower wages than incumbents. This is consistent with
the evidence of section (2).
25where Φz,ε denotes the stationary density of (z,ε).
Notice that in the absence of mobility costs, aggregate output is the appropriate measure of
welfare in this economy. This value can be compared to its counterpart in the model of section (3).
Using the estimated parameters suggests that the contribution of excess workers ￿ows to aggregate
welfare is about 1.16 percent of aggregate output in the economy of section (3).
To understand what￿s behind this number, assume for simplicity that the non-negativity con-
straint on gross in￿ows never binds. This assumption, while literally not true, represents a good
￿rst approximation as, in practice, the constraint on gross in￿ows rarely binds. Under this cir-








where the inequality is due to the fact that υl < 1. Intuitively, the gain from gross ￿o w si sl a r g e r
the lower the productivity υl of a bad match, the more often gross ￿ows occur (i.e. the larger p),
the longer an agent￿s lifespan, as indexed by δ, and the larger the income share τ of output. Notice
that the key parameter in (19) is υl, with υl = 1 (i.e. the unconditional expectation of υ) yielding
zero gain from excess ￿ows. The estimated value of υl is 0.966, which is close enough to one to
lead to relatively small gains from excess migration ￿ows.33 Of course, given the relative simple
structure of the model and the cross-sectional nature of the earnings data, this ￿gure has to be
interpreted cautiously.
8 Conclusions
This paper makes two contributions. First, it presents in a systematic way the main stylized facts
about net and gross ￿ows of workers across U.S. states. Then, it introduces and estimates a model
of workers￿ ￿ows across locations. The model is consistent with the main features of the data.
In particular, it is able to account for the lower cross-sectional dispersion of gross out￿ow rates
than both gross and net in￿ow rates. The latter observation points to the importance of gross
in￿ows, rather than gross out￿ows, as channel through which the state economy adjusts to local
shocks. The model embeds both kinds of adjustments. In simulations, temporal variations in gross
in￿ows appear to be the standard channel of adjustment to shocks. The out￿ow channel is active
intermittently, with outbursts of out￿ows being followed by long periods of relatively constant ￿ows.
The estimated parameters of the model are used to compute the gains from workers￿ excess
reallocation across U.S. states. The latter represent about one percent of output.
I conclude with a few remarks about future research in this area. There are two features
of the data that the model cannot reproduce. First, the model predicts that out￿ow rates in a
location are highly positively correlated with both gross and net in￿ows. This is at odds with the
data, as observed out￿ow rates display a small positive correlation with gross in￿ows and a small
negative correlation with net in￿ows. One way to address this problem would be to introduce in the
33Plugging the estimated parameters in (19) yields a gain of 0.9 percent of aggregate output.
26model a shock that aﬀects out￿ows directly. For example, in the current version of the paper, if an
agent draws an idiosyncratic shock υh, the good match with the location lasts until the agent dies or
voluntarily leave the location. Alternatively, one could assume that the duration of all idiosyncratic
matches in a location is stochastic. In this setting, locations hit by aggregate ￿destruction￿ shocks
would experience a gross out￿ow of workers, which is likely to reduce the correlation between gross
out￿ows and the other ￿ows, in addition to making out￿ows more volatile.
Second, the model can reproduce only a fraction of the observed dispersion in average real
earnings across states and the observed correlation between wages and net ￿ows. The observed
dispersion of average earnings can be attributed to two potentially complementary causes. On the
one hand, population ￿ows might be subject to adjustment costs that slow down the process of β-
convergence of earnings across locations. This will result into larger cross-sectional dispersion at a
point in time. On the other hand, diﬀerences in real earnings might capture diﬀerences in amenities
across locations. As discussed above, it is not easy to determine a-priori which amenities people
value. The positive correlation between real earnings and measures of ￿good weather￿ across states
suggests that weather might not be the appropriate amenity to consider. Of course, it could be
that the observed diﬀerences in real earnings are due to measurement error because of the diﬃculty
of accurately measuring the level of prices in diﬀerent locations. The availability of better data is
crucial for further progress in this area.
More generally, the model introduced here can be naturally extended to evaluate the impact
of international migration (i.e. net in￿ows of population from outside the aggregate economy) on
the wages and internal mobility of natives. Borjas et al. (1997) carry out such exercise using a
reduced-form model of internal net migration ￿ows. Extending their analysis to consider gross ￿ows
would shed light on the process by which states absorb larger external migration. Does the latter
lead to larger out￿ows of natives or less in￿ows from other states? Addressing this and related
questions is an interesting topic of future research.
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29AD a t a A p p e n d i x
Sample Selection
All the measures of gross and net ￿ows and the stock of population that are reported in the paper
are computed using a sample of individuals that, at the time of the relevant Census, satisfy the
following restrictions:
￿ were between 27 and 60 years of age (as of their last birthday);
￿ were not living in group quarters;
￿ were in the labor force but not in the armed forces;
￿ if foreign-born, had immigrated to the U.S. at least 5 years before the Census year;
￿ were not living abroad 5 years before the Census year;
￿ were not living in the Census year or 5 years before the Census year, in either Alaska, Hawaii,
or the District of Columbia.
In what follows, I will refer to the selected sample as the ￿population￿. The number of selected
individual observations is , representing million people.
Measures of Flows
In order to construct measures of gross and net ￿ows I adopt the following procedure. Individual i
is observed living in state j in Census year τ. The same individual is also observed living in state
k in year τ −5. Construct an indicator function Iiτ (j) for each individual i such that Iiτ (j)=1i f
individual i was recorded as living in location j in Census year τ and zero otherwise. Also, de￿ne
an indicator function Iiτ (j) such that Iiτ (j) = 1 if individual i, interviewed in Census year τ,
reported living in location j in year τ − 5. Total out￿ow of population from location j between







where ￿iτ is the person weight (perwt) assigned by the year τ Census to individual i. The total












30Ia l s od e n o t eb yyjτ the total population that was interviewed in year τ0s Census that was living















The net ￿ow rate into location j between τ − 5a n dτ is de￿ned as the diﬀerence between in￿ow
and out￿ow rates:
b djτ = b xjτ − b ojτ.
Accounting for Heterogeneity
There are (at least) two sources of heterogeneity I need to worry about. The ￿rst concerns het-
erogeneity among locations (U.S. states) in the demographic composition of their population. For
example, if state A has a younger workforce than state B, and, if younger individuals are charac-
terized by higher mobility, then measures of out￿ows from state A will be higher than from state
B due to these demographic diﬀerences. Given that, in the model, all individuals have the same
age I need to control for these diﬀerences when constructing measures of out￿ows and in￿ows. The
second, equally important, issue is that while in the model all locations are identical in terms of
their ￿physical attributes￿, in the data, instead, diﬀerent states are characterized by very diﬀerent
geographic features, sizes, etc. For example, out￿ow rates might be higher from smaller (size being
measured in terms of land area) states.
In practice, adjusting the data to take into account these concerns is not straightforward, because
while some of the heterogeneity across states can be safely taken as exogenous (e.g., their land
area), other features such as their demographic composition are likely not to be so.
In what follows I proceed in two steps. First, in order to construct measures of population ￿ows
that are free from potential composition eﬀects, I divide the population in each location (state) in
diﬀerent cells, de￿ned by the following characteristics in the Census year:
￿ age (age); 7 age groups: 27-31, 32-36, 37-41, 42-46, 47-51, 52-56, 57-60;
￿ education (educ99); 5 education groups: high-school dropout, high-school diploma, some
college, college degree, above college;
31￿ industry of employment (ind), including the unemployment state; 14 industries: (1) unem-
ployed, (2) agriculture, ￿shing, forestry and mining, (3) utilities, (4) construction, (5) manu-
facturing, (6) wholesale and retail sales, (7) transportation and wharehousing, (8) information
and communication, (9) ￿nance, insurance, real estate and leasing, (10) professional, scienti￿c,
management, (11) educational, health, social service, (12) arts, entertainment, recreation, (13)
other services, (14) public administration.
Denote each cell by g and the collection of cells by G. There are 490 cells. For each cell g it is


































When aggregating the in￿ow and out￿ow measures across cells, I use the weight υgτ to control for












υgτ ￿ b xjgτ.
Similarly, it is possible to de￿ne net ￿ows.
The second step of the procedure consists of controlling for geographical and historical diﬀerences
among U.S. states and the eﬀect these might have on population ￿ows. I do this by running separate
cross-sectional regressions of in￿ow and out￿ow rates on the following state-level variables: (1) land
area, (2) year when state joined the U.S., (3) number of metropolitan areas within a state with
population larger than 500,000 (computed including all inhabitants) in the 2000 Census. The in￿ow
and out￿ow rates presented in the main body of the paper are the residuals from these regressions.
Real Weekly Earnings
32Data on workers￿ weekly earnings were computed from the Census 2000 by summing annual wage
income (incwage), business and farm income (incbus00), and welfare income (incwelfr), and
dividing the sum by the number of weeks worked (wkswork1). Each source of income refers to
the year 1999. I have dropped from the sample a very small number of observations for which an
individual reported zero annual earnings but a positive number of weeks worked for 1999. In a
few instances reported earnings by self-employed individuals were negative, and these observations
have been dropped. Given that earnings refer to 1999 and the worker￿s labor force participation
status refers to the time of the survey, a small fraction of individuals (about 2.5 percent of the
sample) reported zero annual earnings and zero weeks worked in 1999. I have also dropped these
individuals from the sample.
The earnings data were de￿ated using the ACCRA Cost of Living index for the third quarter
of 1999. This index measures relative price levels (gross of taxes) for consumer goods and services
(including housing) in a number of U.S. cities.34 This number varies from quarter to quarter, and the
third quarter of 1999 was selected to maximize coverage of locations (330). Using information on the
workers￿ metropolitan statistical area or PUMA of residence in 2000 (found in the Census), I have
matched workers with a value of the Cost of Living index in their area of residence. Unfortunately,
the limitations in the coverage of the ACCRA index prevent one from being able to do so for all
workers in the Census sample. In particular, only 53 percent of the workers could be matched with
a value of the Cost of Living Index. The results reported in the main text of the paper refer only
to these workers (about 2.5 million individuals).
The logarithm of real weekly earnings was regressed on the following variables: 48 dummies for
workers￿ state of residence in 2000 (statefip), a measure of workers￿ experience (computed sub-
tracting years of education from the workers￿ age) and experience squared, 17 education dummies
(educ99), a workers￿ sex (sex), 3 race dummies (￿white￿, ￿black￿ and ￿others￿, from raced), 14
sectoral dummies (from ind), and 26 occupational dummies (from occ). The R2 of this regression
was 30 percent.
March Current Population Survey
March CPS data for the years 1999-2003 were used to compute the fraction of individuals moving
across U.S. states for job-related reasons. During these years the March CPS contains a question
regarding an individual￿s primary reason for changing residence with respect to the previous year.
The Census does not contain such question. The March CPS questionnaire identi￿es 16 diﬀerent
primary reasons for moving, with ￿New job or job transfer￿ (33 percent of the answers) representing
the most-frequent single answer, followed by ￿Other family reasons￿ (13 percent). In order to
compute the fraction of individuals moving for job related reasons I have ￿rst applied the sample
selection criteria listed above to the March CPS data. Then, the survey￿s diﬀerent 16 reasons
for moving were aggregated into two categories: job-related and non job-related reasons. The
aggregation is relatively straightforward, with the exception of moves motivated by the desire of
new, better or cheaper housing. I have included those reasons in the job-related move. The rationale
34Given that the index only measures relative price levels, it cannot be used to compare the price level in the same
location over time.
33for this choice is that the wage data used to calibrate the model have been de￿ated using price
indices that include housing prices.
B Details On Numerical Implementation
This section describes the steps that I followed in solving and estimating the model. The algorithm is
comprised of three loops: one for ￿nding the value function conditional on e and θ,o n ef o r￿nding
the equilibrium of the model for given θ, and one for ￿nding θ in order to match the empirical
moments of interest. Every change in θ entails a new equilibrium e,w h i l ean e we requires the
computation of the associated value function.
Step 1 (Guess). Start from an initial guess for the parameter vector θ and for the value of
migration e. The guess for e is updated in Step 3 below, while the guess for θ is updated in Step 4.
Step 2 (Dynamic Programming). Solve the dynamic programming problem described in section
(3). This is the most time-consuming step of the procedure because there are four continuous state
variables in the problem (recall that s =( y,n−1,z,ε)) and because the procedure involves numerical
integration of the value function with respect to the density q(u) of the innovation u. Last, it is
necessary to take into account the possibility that the constraint that keeps gross in￿ows from
becoming negative binds (x ≥ 0). The solution of the dynamic programming problem yields gross
in￿ows x(s) and the probability of out￿ow q(s) for an agent with match υh as functions of the state
vector s. These two functions allow one to recover all the other variables of interest, in particular
the location￿s population y(s) conditional on s.
Step 3 (Equilibrium). Solve for the equilibrium value of e by de￿ning the function
f(e)=
Z
y(s)Φ(s)ds − 1. (20)
The value e∗ such that f(e∗) = 0 represents the equilibrium value of migration. The integral in
equation (20) is computed by simulating the economy for a very large number of periods (5 million),
obtaining {yt}
T






In practice the zero of (20) is computed using a simple bisection procedure. The function f(e)i s
decreasing in e because a higher value of migration must be associated with higher expected wages
which reduce ￿rms￿ demand for labor. Notice that for each candidate value of e it is necessary to
go back to Step 2 and solve the dynamic programming problem again.
Step 4 (Estimation). Given e∗, it is feasible to compute the equilibrium value of all the variables
of interest. The vector θ is estimated by constructing the model counterpart of the six moments
listed in the text (section 5) and choosing θ so that the model-generated moments are exactly equal
to their empirical counterparts. Since there are six parameters and six moments, this is an exactly
identi￿ed model. The problem then becomes one of solving six non-linear equations in six unknowns.
34The model-generated moments are constructed by simulating for S = 100 times arti￿cial data for
J = 48 locations for a number of P =1 ,000 periods. For each simulation s =1 ,2,..,S, the data for
all but the last 12 periods are then discarded. The data for the last of the 12 periods are instead
used to compute the cross-sectional moments, while the whole 12 periods are then used to compute
the time-series moments. Recall, though, that each period represents 5 years, while the correlations
of ￿ows across Census years refer to 10 years, therefore in practice only 6 time-series observations
for each location and simulation are used. Six moments are computed for each of the S simulations.
Each moment is then averaged across simulations and compared with its empirical counterpart. In
order to ￿nd a solution for this non-linear system of six equations in six unknowns I have used
Broyden￿s algorithm. The latter operates in the following way (for a more detailed description, see
Press et al. (1996), chapter 9). First, it numerically approximates the Jacobian matrix associated
with the non-linear system. It then uses this approximate Jacobian to ￿nd an updated vector θ
by implementing the Newton step, which guarantees quadratic convergence if the initial guess is
close to the solution. If the Newton step is not ￿successful￿, the algorithm tries a smaller step by
backtracking along the Newton dimension. When an acceptable step is determined, θ is updated
and the algorithm can proceed in the way described above, once an updated Jacobian has been
obtained. Since the numerical computation of the Jacobian can be costly (and in this model it
is), the Jacobian at the new vector θ is iteratively approximated using Broyden￿s formula. The
non-linear solver stops when the maximum percentage diﬀerence between the simulated moments
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Figure 5 - Net Flow Rates and Hot Weather










































































































Unit Price of Labor
Average Efficiency Units
Net Flow Rate